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EXCISE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 17090

EXDIS

USMISSION GENEVA PASS TO USINF DELEGATION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, CH, UR, PEPR
SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS CABLE IS PART OF A SERIES INTENDED TO ASSIST THE DEPARTMENT IN PREPARING BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS PAPERS FOR THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS IN CHINA. INFO ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED TO COMMENT SEPARATELY TO THE DEPARTMENT.
3. CHINESE INTERESTS: CHINA'S POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL IS DOMINATED BY THREE CONSIDERATIONS. (A) TO PRESERVE CHINA'S FREEDOM OF ACTION EVENTUALLY TO

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OVERCOME ITS INFERIOR POWER POSITION; (B) TO PRESERVE AND HIGHLIGHT CHINA'S THIRD-WORLD CREDENTIALS BY NOT SEEMING TO JOIN AN EXCLUSIVE NUCLEAR CLUB THAT SEEKS TO RETAIN A MONOPOLY; AND (C) TO PROJECT AN IMAGE AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

4. THE FIRST CONSIDERATION HAS MOTIVATED BEIJING TO REJECT MOST NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

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CHINA STILL SEEMS A LONG WAY FROM ADHERENCE TO THE NPT, MUCH LESS TO A COMPREHENSIVE BAN. THE CHINESE MIGHT CEASE ATMOSPHERIC TESTS, [WHICH THEY HAVE SAID PRIVATELY ARE NECESSITATED BY TECHNICAL DEFICIENCIES IN CONDUCTING UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS.] CHINA'S RHETORICAL DENUNCIATION OF BOTH SUPERPOWERS FOR CAUSING THE ARMS RACE, FREQUENTLY WITHOUT DIFFERENTIATION, IS A POSITION SHARED BY MOST OF THE THIRD WORLD, WHERE CHINA IS ATTEMPTING TO CULTIVATE ITS OWN CONSTITUENCY. BEIJING'S SOMEWHAT MORE ACTIVE ROLE ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS IN RECENT YEARS, INCLUDING ITS FIRST COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL PRESENTED AT SSOD II AND ITS SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL RESOLUTIONS AT THE UN, REFLECTS AN INTEREST IN PROJECTING A RESPONSIBLE GLOBAL IMAGE.

5. COMMERCIAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS LIE BEHIND CHINA'S SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TO A NUMBER OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. ALTHOUGH THIS REMAINS ON A SMALL SCALE COMPARED TO THE U.S., USSR, FRANCE AND OTHER BIG LEAGUE ARMS EXPORTERS. COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE DOMINANT IN CHINA'S EXPORT OF SOME NON-SAFEGUARDED SENSITIVE NUCLEAR

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MATERIALS, SUCH AS URANIUM AND HEAVY WATER.

6. THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN VOCIFEROUS IN ATTACKING THE SOVIET/VIETNAMESE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN KAMPUCHEA AND AFGHANISTAN.

7. U.S. INTERESTS: IT IS IN U.S. INTERESTS TO NUDGE CHINA TOWARD MORE RESPONSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. CHINA IS DEEPLY INTERESTED IN THE COURSE OF OUR ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUES WITH THE SOVIETS ON START, INF AND MBFR, AND WE SHOULD KEEP THEM UP TO DATE, SINCE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF EACH OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE A BEARING ON CHINA'S OWN SECURITY.

8. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN PATIENTLY CONTINUING EFFORTS TO OBTAIN MORE CHINESE RESPONSIVENESS CONCERNING NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS (SEE SEPTEL ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION), WHILE SEEKING BETTER COORDINATION OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AT INTERNATIONAL FORA.

9. ACHIEVEMENTS: CHINA'S SLOW FORWARD MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE POSITION ON DISARMAMENT SERVES U.S. INTERESTS. RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR DELEGATIONS AT THE GENEVA CD HAVE BEEN COOPERATIVE. AT LAST YEAR'S

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UNGA, THE PRC VOTED FOR A NUMBER OF U.S. SUPPORTED
ARMS CONTROL RESOLUTIONS, SUCH AS PROPOSALS TO
REDUCE THE SIZE OF MILITARY BUDGETS AND TO EXTEND
THE LIFE OF THE SPECIAL UN CHEMICAL WEAPONS EXPERT

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GROUP. THE CHINESE HAVE CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED SOVIET
PROPAGANDA PLOYS AT THE UN AND ELSEWHERE, STATING
THEIR "PRINCIPLED OPPOSITION TO SHAM SOVIET DIS-
ARMAMENT PROPOSALS." WHILE CONTINUING TO REJECT
THE NPT, THE CHINESE HAVE ASSERTED PRIVATELY THAT
THEY HAVE NOT ASSISTED AND WILL NOT ASSIST ANY
COUNTRY IN DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE CHINESE

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HAVE SIGNED PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF TLAHELCO. PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. AND OTHERS HAS INCREASED CHINESE ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LAX CONTROLS ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS.

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10. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND DISSATISFACTION: MORE SO THAN IN OTHER AREAS, CHINA'S RHETORICAL POSITION HAS EQUATED THE SUPERPOWERS ON DISARMAMENT, DENOUNCING BOTH FOR PRECIPITATING THE ARMS RACE. THIS POSTURE HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO OCCASIONAL CHINESE PROPAGANDA

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SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE. CHINESE DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS ARE, IN THE U.S. VIEW, VAGUE AND UNREALISTIC. FOR ITS PART, CHINA DOUBTS THAT EITHER SUPERPOWER IS SERIOUS ABOUT DISARMAMENT, ALTHOUGH IN PRACTICE IT IS USUALLY TOUGHER ON THE SOVIETS.

11. WHILE OUR PRODDING ON EXPORT CONTROL APPEARS TO HAVE LED TO A CHINESE TIGHTENING UP, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PROBLEM WILL CONTINUE. WHILE LISTENING TO OUR BRIEFINGS OF DIVERSIONS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, THE CHINESE HAVE NOT COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO EMPLOY SAFEGUARDS, DEMAND ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES AGAINST DIVERSION, OR OTHERWISE COOPERATE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE. THE CHINESE HAVE ALSO REFUSED TO GIVE US AN UNEQUIVOCAL ANSWER THAT THEY ARE NOT ASSISTING PAKISTAN'S REPORTED EFFORTS TO MANUFACTURE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

12. CHINESE POSITION: THE CHINESE WILL BE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN HEARING A BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF U.S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT TALKS. THEY WILL SAY THEY DO NOT OPPOSE THESE TALKS, BUT WILL EXPRESS SKEPTICISM THAT THERE WILL BE ANY POSITIVE OUTCOME. THE CHINESE WILL HINT OR STATE OUTRIGHT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MORE AT FAULT FOR THE U.S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT STALEMATE, BUT THEY WILL NOT BACK ANY SPECIFIC AMERICAN PROPOSAL. THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT BE FORTHCOMING ON THE PAKISTAN ISSUE, AND ON THE GENERAL ISSUE OF EXPORT CONTROLS. THE CHINESE MAY REVIEW THEIR SSOD DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL CALLING FOR THE SUPERPOWERS TO SLASH THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVER SYSTEM INVENTORIES BY 50 PERCENT AND PROMISE

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NO NEW DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURE OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PROPOSAL SUGGESTS THAT THIS BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS (I.E. CHINA) JOINING THE PROCESS AND TAKING APPROPRIATE STEPS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS.

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13. U.S. POSITION: WE SHOULD BRIEF THE CHINESE ON OUR POSITIONS AND OBJECTIVES AT THE START AND INF TALKS AND PRESENT A PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE. WE MAY WISH TO REASSURE THE CHINESE THAT WE WILL REACH NO AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS THAT WOULD HARM CHINESE INTERESTS. WE SHOULD POINT OUT TO THE CHINESE THAT EQUATING THE INTENTIONS AND RESPECTIVE IMPACTS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS IS NOT ONLY GROSSLY MISLEADING, BUT ALSO PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF THE SOVIETS. OCCASIONAL CHINESE RHETORICAL SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE MOVE ANT IN WESTERN EUROPE SERVES ONLY SOVIET INTERESTS IN WEAKENING POLITICAL RESOLVE TO FACE THE SOVIET TWDEAT. .PROMOTING NEUTRALIST THINKING IN EUROPE, AND RESTRAINING U.S. DEPLOYMENTS DESIGNED TO COUNTER THOSE THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY PUT IN PLACE.

14. WE SHOULD STRESS THE DANGERS POSED BY UNSAFEGUARDED CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPORTS WHICH CAN BE READILY DIVERTED

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TO DESTINATIONS THAT THE CHINESE THEMSELVES WOULD NOT APPROVE (E.G., SOUTH AFRICA) AND THEREBY HEIGHTEN THE RISK OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. WE SHOULD URGE THE CHINESE TO UNDERTAKE SAFEGUARDS PARALLEL TO THOSE REQUIRED BY THE IAEA, AND OFFER TO MAKE OUR EXPERTS AVAILABLE TO EXPLAIN PROCEDURES WE EMPLOY IN DESIGNING SAFEGUARDS. IN THESE VARIOUS AREAS, WE COULD PRESS HOME THAT CHINA AS AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY SHOULD SET A POSITIVE EXAMPLE IN ACTING TO WORK AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

15. WE SHOULD LEAVE THE CHINESE IN NO DOUBT THAT PAKISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION WOULD BRING INTO OPERATION U.S. LEGISLATION ENDING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. [QUITE ASIDE FROM THIS, WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT MOVEMENT BY ISLAMABAD TOWARD A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE POTENTIAL WOULD

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RATHER THAN ENHANCE PAKISTAN'S SECURITY, RISKING A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE BY INDIA AND ENCOURAGING INDIA TO LAUNCH AN ALL-OUT PROGRAM TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WOULD DESTABILIZE THE REGION AND PROVIDE MOSCOW WITH OPPORTUNITIES TO CONSOLIDATE IN AFGHANISTAN AND FURTHER EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE. HUMMEL

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