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INQUIRE=DOC26D
ITEM NO=00584859

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX662 MCN = 94171/25342 TOR = 941711932
OTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2457 1711932-~~SSSS~~-RUEALGX.

ZNY ~~SSSS~~

HEADER

O 201932Z JUN 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI IOC BOLLING AFB DC//DTA//
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 201917Z JUN 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-HEX/INM-FOR GELBARD// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE
RHCGRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//, IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 15 [REDACTED]

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SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] ANALYTICAL STUDY, POTENTIAL

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FOR VIOLENCE IN MEXICO PRIOR TO 941231 (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~-----SECRET-----~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940101-940615

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(S/NF)~~ AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN MEXICO REVEALS SEVERAL POTENTIAL ARMED-ACTION SCENARIOS, IDENTIFIED AS "VIOLENCE WINDOWS," WHICH EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, THE EZLN REBELS, OR OTHER ELEMENTS COULD INITIATE PRIOR TO 941231.

TEXT: ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN MEXICO REVEALS SEVERAL POTENTIAL ARMED-ACTION SCENARIOS, IDENTIFIED AS "VIOLENCE WINDOWS," WHICH EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN) REBELS, OR OTHER ELEMENTS (NON-RULING PARTIES, OTHER INSURGENT OR DISSIDENT GROUPS, NARCO TRAFFICKERS) COULD INITIATE PRIOR TO 941231. [REDACTED] RESULT OF THE STAFF STUDY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INDICATES A BETTER THAN AVERAGE POTENTIAL FOR ARMED VIOLENCE PRIOR TO THAT END-DATE. THE "VIOLENCE WINDOWS" ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE; THEY ARE TIME LINED AND COULD IN FACT OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY OR CONSECUTIVELY. NO PRIORITIZATION OR STATISTICAL PROBABILITY OF WHICH "VIOLENCE WINDOW" SCENARIO WILL OCCUR HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED; RATHER, THE POTENTIAL FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF ANY OF THESE SCENARIOS HAS BEEN ASSESSED AND REPORTED.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE MOST LIKELY WINDOW IS RIGHT AFTER THE ELECTIONS [REDACTED] WITH THE EZLN INITIATING ARMED CONFLICT UNDER THE PRETENSE OF REACTING TO ELECTORAL FRAUD, SHOULD THE EZLN'S LEADERSHIP BELIEVE THE ELECTIONS WERE NOT FAIR, HONEST, AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EVEN THOUGH THE MILITARY (AT LEAST AT THE JUNIOR- TO MID-LEVEL OFFICER LEVELS) MAY FEEL MILITARILY PREPARED TO GO AFTER THE EZLN, IT IS FAR LESS LIKELY THAT THE GOM WOULD INITIATE HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTION [REDACTED] OR EVEN AFTER WITHOUT SOME [REDACTED] PROVOCATION.

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

-- TEXT--

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. THE RULING PARTY OF MEXICO, THE INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRI), WISHES TO MAINTAIN EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF MEXICO.

B. THE MEXICAN ARMY IS FIRMLY UNDER CONTROL OF THE RULING PARTY'S CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP AND WILL NOT ATTACK THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN) PRIOR TO OR AFTER THE ELECTIONS, WITHOUT SPECIFIC ORDERS TO ATTACK FROM THE PRESIDENCY, WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO COME PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS.

C. [REDACTED]

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PAGE:3229

D. THE EZLN IS AN INDEPENDENT REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION WITH ITS OWN POLITICAL AND MILITARY AGENDAS; THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO (GOM) DOES NOT CONTROL ITS (EZLN'S) LEADERSHIP.

E. BOTH THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES AND THE EZLN HAVE SUFFICIENT PREPARATION, SIZE, AND WILL TO ACT TO INITIATE AN OFFENSIVE, IF THAT IS JUDGED BY THEIR LEADERSHIP TO BE IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS.

F. THE EZLN HAS CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER TERRORIST OR INSURGENT GROUPS IN MEXICO WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY CAUSE THE SPREAD OF THE INDIGENOUS/PEASANT FIGHT IN MEXICO TO OTHER STATES-- MOST LIKELY OAXACA, GUERRERO, MORELOS, TABASCO, PUEBLA, SINALOA AND MICHOACAN.

G. SHOULD THE EZLN FEAR A SURPRISE ATTACK BY THE GOM COMBINED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF AN UNFAIR ELECTION, WE ASSUME THAT IT MIGHT BE STIMULATED TO ACT PRIOR TO THE ELECTION. IF THE EZLN IS WILLING TO GIVE THE PEOPLE A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN A FAIR AND OPEN ELECTION WITH NO FEAR OF GOM ACTION AGAINST THE EZLN, WE ASSUME THAT IT WOULD BE MORE INCLINED TO ADOPT A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

A. EZLN.

1) THE EZLN OCCUPIES A PORTION OF THE MEXICAN NATIONAL TERRITORY AND IS MAKING DEMANDS ON THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE GOM IS CURRENTLY NOT WILLING TO MEET.

2) ON 940611 THE EZLN REJECTED THE PEACE PROPOSALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO; AN EZLN SPOKESMAN, SUBCOMANDANTE MARCOS, CLAIMED THE PACT CONCEALED A DEATH THREAT AND OFFERED A SOLUTION WITHOUT DIGNITY AS THE REASONS FOR THE REJECTION.

3) THE EZLN HAS PROVEN ADEPT AT THE USE OF BOTH VERBAL AND WRITTEN PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND THE MEXICAN PUBLIC.

B. MEXICAN MILITARY.

1) THE MEXICAN MILITARY HAS DEVELOPED, AND IS PREPARED TO EXECUTE ON ORDER, AN OFFENSIVE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR CHIAPAS. IT HAS EXISTING STRATEGIC PLANS FOR PREPARED TO EXECUTE ON ORDER, AN OFFENSIVE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR CHIAPAS. IT HAS EXISTING STRATEGIC PLANS FOR MOBILIZATION THROUGHOUT THE NATIONAL TERRITORY.

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PAGE:3230

2) THE MEXICAN MILITARY IS UPDATING DOCTRINE TO BETTER PREPARE, STRATEGICALLY AND TACTICALLY, TO FIGHT A PROTRACTED GUERRILLA WAR.

3) THE MEXICAN MILITARY IS REBUILDING ELEMENTS OF ITS FORCE STRUCTURE TO BETTER FIGHT THE SAME TYPE OF INTERNAL ENEMY.


4) THE MEXICAN MILITARY IS UPDATING ITS EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THE ABOVE MENTIONED DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES.

5) 


C. THE RAINY SEASON HAS STARTED IN CHIAPAS. ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS WILL LIMIT MEXICAN ARMY AERIAL AND GROUND ACTIVITIES. THIS SEASON WILL EXTEND THROUGH DECEMBER.

D. THE MEXICAN TRADITION OF PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION IS FULLY OPERATIONAL; THIS RELIEF OF SOCIAL TENSIONS AND PUBLIC DISPLAY WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

E. MEXICO IS SCHEDULED TO HOLD ELECTIONS 940821. THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD EXPECT THE MILITARY TO KEEP AS MANY TROOPS AS POSSIBLE AVAILABLE TO COUNTER WHATEVER CIVIL UNREST MIGHT RESULT FROM THE ELECTIONS, WHICH REQUIRES THE MILITARY NOT BECOME ENGAGED IN RENEWED FIGHTING AGAINST THE EZLN UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS.



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C. BACKGROUND.

1) ON 940101 THE ARMED INSURRECTION IN MEXICO'S SOUTHERN CHIAPAS STATE BEGAN WITH THE OCCUPATION OF FOUR TOWNS-- SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, OCOSINGO, ALTAMIRANO, AND LAS MARGARITAS. THE MILITARY RESPONDED AND MOVED ACTIVELY AGAINST THE EZLN GUERRILLAS THE FOLLOWING DAY.

2) BY 940112 A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN CALLED. SHORTLY AFTER, A PEACE COMMISSION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND A PEACE COMMISSIONER, MANUEL ((CAMACHO)) SOLIS, NAMED. A GENERAL AMNESTY WAS PROCLAIMED SHORTLY AFTER. THE CEASEFIRE HAS HELD. THE PEACE COMMISSIONER RESIGNED 940616.

3) ON 940612 THE EZLN REJECTED THE PEACE ACCORDS OFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO. THE GOM PEACE COMMISSIONER MANUEL ((CAMACHO)) TOLD THE U.S. AMBASSADOR THAT PEACE AGREEMENTS WOULD NEED TO BE REACHED BY MID JUNE OR THEY PROBABLY WOULDN'T HAPPEN BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD 940821 FOR LOCAL, STATE AND NATIONAL POSITIONS. NEWSPAPERS ARE CARRYING REPORTS OF LARGE SHIPMENTS OF ILLEGAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM THE U.S. TO MEXICO. THE MEXICAN ARMY IS MAKING PREPARATIONS TO FIGHT A JUNGLE GUERRILLA WAR, PREPARATIONS WHICH WILL NOT BE COMPLETE PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THE RAINY SEASON HAS STARTED IN MEXICO WHICH WILL LIMIT AIR AND ROAD TRAVEL IN THE MOUNTAIN REGIONS OF SOUTHERN MEXICO. THE EZLN HAS TAKEN OVER A LARGE SECTION OF THE STATE OF CHIAPAS AND MAINTAINS COMPLETE CONTROL IN THE RURAL, EAST-CENTRAL PORTION OF THE STATE, ROUGHLY THAT AREA WHICH INCLUDES THE LACANDON RAIN FOREST AND THE

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PAGE:3232

USUMACINTA RIVER BORDERING ON GUATEMALA.

C. DISCUSSION POINTS.

1) GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO.

THE GOM, REPRESENTED BY THE RULING FRI PARTY DESIRES TO MAINTAIN ITS HISTORICAL HOLD ON THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT. IT HAS PREVIOUSLY PROVEN CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING CONTROL, [REDACTED]

THE RULING PARTY (PRI) LOST ITS POPULAR CANDIDATE TO AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS 940323; THE FRI'S REPLACEMENT CANDIDATE, ERNESTO ((ZEDILLO)), IS NOT SEEN AS A CANDIDATE WITH THE SAME LEADERSHIP QUALITIES AS HIS PREDECESSOR. ZEDILLO HAS HAD SOME NEGATIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE MILITARY, PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE SINCE BEEN OVERCOME AND APPARENTLY RESOLVED TO THE MILITARY'S SATISFACTION. MANY CITIZENS OF MEXICO FEEL THAT THIS ELECTION COULD MARK THE END OF THE FRI'S DOMINATION AND CONTROL OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN MEXICO. THE TWO MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTIES, THE PRD AND PAN, HAVE GROWN INTO FORMIDABLE OPPONENTS WITH, DIEGO ((FERNANDEZ)) OF THE PAN SHOWING INCREASED POPULARITY, AT SOME TIMES AND IN SOME PLACES EXCEEDING THAT OF ZEDILLO. IF THE ELECTIONS ARE HONEST (MANY CITIZENS DON'T BELIEVE THEY WILL BE) THE FRI WILL LOSE MANY FEDERAL DEPUTY AND SENATE SLOTS, AND POTENTIALLY THE PRESIDENCY AS WELL.


2) THE MEXICAN MILITARY.

THE MILITARY IS UNDER THE FIRM CONTROL OF THE NATION'S CIVILIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. SOME, YOUNGER ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S POLICIES, INCLUDING THOSE RESULTING IN A PUBLIC LOSS AND HUMILIATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE CHIAPAS CAMPAIGN'S FIRST PHASE (ENDING WITH A CEASEFIRE AND ATTACKS AGAINST THE MILITARY FROM THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND LACKADAISICAL SUPPORT FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH); THESE ELEMENTS ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND DO NOT REPRESENT AT THIS TIME A THREAT TO MILITARY STABILITY.

THE MILITARY HAS PREPARED A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE CHIAPAS THEATER; THE PLAN IS BUILT ON A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE. THE MILITARY IS PREPARED TO EXECUTE THE PLAN ON RECEIPT OF AN EXECUTIVE ORDER. THE MILITARY WOULD WILLINGLY INITIATE THE CAMPAIGN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY AND WOULD INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE EZLN AND PROBABLY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF CHIAPAS;

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B) ~~PREEMPTIVE ACTIVITIES~~

WITH THE REJECTION BY THE EZLN OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL FOR SETTLING THE SITUATION IN CHIAPAS; THE INCREASE IN NARCOTICS-BASED TERRORIST BOMBINGS AND OTHER VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRING

THROUGHOUT MEXICO; THE INCREASED SEIZURE OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY; AND THE LIKELIHOOD FOR LARGE-SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS-- IT APPEARS THE MEXICAN ARMY HAS BEEN GIVEN THE MISSION TO PREEMPT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY PRE- OR POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE BY EITHER ISOLATING ANY POTENTIAL TROUBLE MAKERS, OR PUTTING THEM ON THE DEFENSIVE SO THEY WON'T BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY REACT DURING THE ELECTION SEASON.

1) A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN MEXICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITY.

2) THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LARGE TASK FORCE

3) THE REINFORCEMENT OF ARMY UNITS INTO POTENTIAL TROUBLE AREAS.

4) REPORTS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING BY UNITS NOT NORMALLY EXPECTED TO PERFORM THIS MISSION.


THE SOURCES OF POTENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE OR ARMED DISTURBANCES WOULD LOGICALLY BE FOCUSED ON TWO DIFFERENT GROUPS. THE FIRST IS THE NARCOTRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS WHO HAVE SHOWN A RECENT TENDENCY FOR EXTREMELY VIOLENT ACTIONS, AND THE SECOND WOULD BE ANY TYPE OF INSURGENT OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUP WITH EITHER REAL OR BELIEVED GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. THUS, ANY INCREASED OR ENHANCED MISSION OF THE MEXICAN ARMY WOULD BE REVEALED BY A CHANGE IN ACTIVITIES AGAINST THESE GROUPS. EACH WILL BE LOOKED AT IN TURN, AND IT CAN BE SEEN THE ARMY HAS TAKEN A MORE ACTIVE ROLE AGAINST BOTH TYPES OF ACTIVITIES.

IN ADDITION TO A MORE FORCEFUL ERADICATION EFFORT TO INCLUDE (FOR THE FIRST TIME) ARMED ENCOUNTERS WITH DRUG TRAFFICKERS IN THE GROWING AREAS,

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
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THE MILITARY HAS REINFORCED (AND IN SOME CASES SUPPLANTED) THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POLICE (PGR) IN SOME COUNTER DRUG ACTIVITIES. IT IS NOW COMMON FOR THE MEXICAN ARMY TO BE PRESENT IN SEARCHING OF SUSPECTED DRUG HOUSES,




DURING THE 1970S, THE STATE OF GUERRERO WAS THE SITE OF A GUERRILLA UPRISING THAT WAS SUPPRESSED BY THE ARMY, AND IT HAS LONG BEEN REPORTED TO BE A HOT SPOT WITH THE POTENTIAL TO FLARE UP SIMILAR TO CHIAPAS. THE U.S. LEGAL ATTACHE HAS ALSO REPORTED AND IT HAS LONG BEEN RUMORED THAT THERE IS AN ARMED BAND OF 150 GUERRILLAS IN THE MOUNTAINS IN GUERRERO WHO SUPPOSEDLY ARE THE REASON FOR A CURRENT 8 BATTALION (1500 SOLDIER) MEXICAN ARMY EXERCISE IN THE AREA. EVEN THOUGH THE ARMY AND THE STATE GOVERNOR HAVE DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF GUERRILLAS IN THE STATE OF GUERRERO, THIS POSITION IS THE NORMAL ONE BOTH WOULD TAKE, AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS COMPLETELY FACTUAL. IT IS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT TO REVEAL THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS IN MEXICO SO CLOSE TO THE AUGUST ELECTIONS.

OPEN SOURCES HAVE REPORTED, AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS ADMITTED THE REINFORCEMENT OF UNITS IN POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLAIMS THE REINFORCEMENTS ARE IN CONJUNCTION WITH COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES, BUT IT DOES IMPROVE THE ARMY POSTURE SHOULD ANY ELECTION DISTURBANCES OCCUR.



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3) THE EZLN.

THE EZLN INITIALLY WON THE PUBLICITY WAR IN MEXICO AND INTERNATIONALLY. THE FIRST PHASE OF THEIR STRATEGIC PLAN-- TO ATTACK THE GOM, TO EMBARRASS THE MILITARY, AND THEN TO RETREAT INTO THEIR JUNGLE STRONGHOLDS, AND FINALLY TO WIN TEMPORARY PEACE CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOM-- SUCCEEDED ADMIRABLY. WITH MINIMAL LOSSES THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY WAS KNOCKED ON ITS HEELS AND FORCED TO SUBMIT TO LENGTHY, PUBLIC PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE EZLN CURRENTLY HOLD A LARGE SECTION OF THE RURAL PORTIONS OF THE STATE OF CHIAPAS FROM WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RECRUIT NEW FORCES, IMPROVE TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND BUILD SUPPLY NETWORKS. THIS CONSOLIDATION PROCESS HAS BEEN LARGELY TO THE BENEFIT OF THE EZLN.

THE REAL STRENGTH OF THE EZLN LIES NOT IN ARMED POWER BUT IN ITS LEADERSHIP, WHICH HAS REVEALED THE PLIGHT OF THE POOR PEOPLE OF CHIAPAS TO THE WORLD. THE EZLN HAS BEEN PREPARING FOR THIS CONFLICT FOR ALMOST EIGHT YEARS AND APPEAR CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A PROTRACTED GUERRILLA WAR. THEY SEEM TO HAVE BOTH THE POLITICAL WILL AND THE WILL TO INFLICT AND SUSTAIN CASUALTIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF A LENGTHY GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN IN MEXICO.

4) OTHER.

OTHER TERRORIST OR REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS EXIST, [REDACTED] IN MEXICO. THE GOVERNOR OF GUERRERO RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT NO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS EXIST IN HIS STATE, DESPITE EXTENSIVE MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS WHICH SUGGEST THE OPPOSITE; IN LATE NOVEMBER, 1993, THE GOVERNOR AND

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MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF CHIAPAS MADE THE SAME CLAIM, AND ATE THEIR WORDS A MONTH LATER. SHOULD THESE GROUPS ACT, IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN THEIR OWN CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY WOULD BE OVER STRETCHED TO ADEQUATELY FIGHT ON TWO OR MORE FRONTS. IF THESE GROUPS ACTED WITH THE EZLN, A GROUP SUCH AS THE TERRORIST, URBAN BOMBER PROCUP-PDLP COULD DESTROY LIMITED TARGETS IN MEXICO

[REDACTED] AND EFFECTIVELY FREEZE THE CITY, FORCING GREATER CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS IN THE CITY AND RESULTING IN FEWER TROOPS AVAILABLE TO ADDRESS THE THREAT OUTSIDE OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY. A COMBINED, WELL-TIMED THREAT WOULD BE VERY EFFECTIVE.

NARCOTRAFFICKERS POTENTIALLY HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO GAIN FROM THIS INSTABILITY. MORE TROOPS INVOLVED IN THE GUERRILLA FIGHT EQUALS FEWER TROOPS INVOLVED IN COUNTER DRUG MISSIONS, AND AS WE HAVE SEEN IN CHIAPAS ALSO DIVERT MORE TRADITIONAL PGR AND POLICE CN EFFORTS. GUERRILLA OCCUPIED AREAS GIVE TRAFFICKERS POTENTIAL FREE OPERATING SPACE. ADDITIONALLY, DRUG-RELATED SERVICES IN TRADE FOR NEEDED ARMS COULD SATISFY THE NEEDS OF BOTH THE TRAFFICKERS AND THE GUERRILLAS.

THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, SOMEWHAT LIMITED IN THE PRESS BUT FULLY AVAILABLE TO THE PEOPLE, CONTINUES UNOBSTRUCTED IN MEXICO. VOCAL, NUMEROUS, LARGE-SCALE SUPPORT FOR THE EZLN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, AND FOR WORKER RIGHTS HAS RESULTED IN MANY PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS. THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IS LARGELY UNABLE TO CURB THESE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS, AS ANY PROHIBITION WOULD WORK AGAINST THE RULING PARTY AS THE ELECTION NEARS.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

A. THE NEXT TWO MONTHS IN MEXICO ARE CRITICAL FOR

[REDACTED] NATIONAL ELECTIONS ARE TWO MONTHS AWAY. VIOLENT ACTIVITIES AND PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS ARE INCREASING THROUGHOUT MEXICO. THE EZLN IS AWARE THAT AFTER THE ELECTIONS THE GOM WILL HAVE LESS NEED-- AS MEDIA AND NGO ATTENTION FADES-- TO HOLD THE ARMY BACK AND THE MEXICAN MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY BE

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ALLOWED TO START ITS OFFENSIVE TO (1) REGAIN FACE AND (2) ELIMINATE VIA ARMED FORCE THE PROBLEM IN CHIAPAS.

B. THE EZLN HAS JUST REPORTEDLY VOTED, ALLEGEDLY BY MORE THAN 98 PERCENT, TO REJECT THE GOM PEACE PROPOSALS. THE GOM IS SCRAMBLING TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT WILL ALLOW THE PRI TO ISOLATE THE PROBLEM, THUS GAINING NEEDED CREDIBILITY TO WIN VOTES AND, HOPEFULLY, THE ELECTIONS.

1) VIOLENCE WINDOW 1. THE EZLN WILL INITIATE HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THE EZLN HAS REJECTED THE PEACE PROPOSALS OF THE GOM AND REALIZES THAT THE GOM WILL NOT GIVE IN TO ALL ITS DEMANDS. IT ALSO REALIZES THAT AFTER THE ELECTIONS IF THE PRI IS STILL IN POWER IT (THE EZLN) WILL HAVE LOST THE INITIATIVE. AFTER THE ELECTIONS THE PRI COULD SEEK A MILITARY SOLUTION, BELIEVING IT WILL HAVE SIX YEARS TO RECOVER FROM ANY ADVERSE PUBLICITY. THEREFORE, WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH IT (THE EZLN) WILL BEGIN MOVING FROM BASE CAMPS BREAKING INTO SMALL GUERRILLA FIGHTING CELLS.

THEIR INITIAL ATTACKS WILL BE CLASSICAL GUERRILLA OPERATIONS CONFINED MOSTLY TO CHIAPAS. OTHER ACTS OF AGGRESSION WILL OCCUR IN OTHER PARTS OF MEXICO, SOME OF WHICH MAY BE SPONSORED BY THE EZLN. OTHER TERRORIST/GUERRILLA OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF CHIAPAS WILL PROBABLY BE CONDUCTED BY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, SOME WHICH ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE EZLN IDEOLOGY AND OTHERS WHO ARE USING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THEIR OWN GAIN. THE INTENT OF THESE ACTIVITIES WILL BE DISRUPTION OF THE ELECTIONS. VOTERS, MANY WHO ARE TIRED OF THE PRI, COULD SEE THIS WINDOW AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE FOR SOMEONE ELSE, WHILE OTHER MAY BE SCARED AND STAY HOME. ANOTHER NET GAIN FOR THE EZLN WOULD BE THE REFOCUS OF WORLD VISION AND OPILION ON THE INDIGENOUS PLIGHT IN MEXICO.

IF THE EZLN DESIRES TO PLACE THE MOST PRESSURE ON THE MILITARY IN MEXICO, THIS SCENARIO IS LIKELY, DESPITE EZLN CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY.

2) VIOLENCE WINDOW 2. MEXICAN MILITARY

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INITIATES HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THE MEXICAN MILITARY HAS A CONTINGENCY PLAN. BY ACTING PREEMPTIVELY IT CAN CONCENTRATE FORCES AND REDUCE THEM PRIOR TO HAVING TO CONFRONT A MEXICO-WIDE PROBLEM.

IF THE CIVILIAN ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT JUDGES THE POLITICAL COSTS TO BE MANAGEABLE, THIS WINDOW'S VIOLENT SCENARIO IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP. HOWEVER, THE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE WORLDWIDE REFOCUS ON BOTH MEXICO'S INDIGENOUS PROBLEM AND IMAGE OF NOT RUNNING A TRULY CLEAN NATIONAL ELECTION MAKES THIS A LOW PROBABILITY COURSE OF ACTION.

3) VIOLENCE WINDOW 3. THE EZLN INITIATES ACTION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. IF THE EZLN BELIEVES THAT FAIR ELECTIONS WEREN'T CONDUCTED, IT COULD EASILY MANIPULATE THE PRESS-- SOME OF WHOM ARE ALREADY PREDISPOSED TO FOLLOW THAT SUGGESTION-- AND USE THIS AS A TRIGGER. THE PRD'S CARDENAS HAS ALREADY STATED IN PRESS RELEASES THAT IF THE ELECTIONS ARE NOT "CLEAN" IT COULD RESULT IN A CIVIL WAR IN MEXICO.



SHOULD THE EZLN WANT TO PLACE MAXIMUM, TIMELY PRESSURE ON THE NEWLY-ELECTED CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP (TO REGAIN LOST INITIATIVE), THIS IS A VERY LIKELY ARMED SCENARIO. EZLN SPOKESMAN MARCOS RECENTLY STATED THAT THE EZLN COULD AND HAS NOT RULED OUT RENEWED ARMED STRUGGLE IF THE GOVERNMENT GOES AGAINST THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE IN THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. THIS IS THE MOST PROBABLE INITIATION WINDOW.

4) VIOLENCE WINDOW 4. THE MEXICAN MILITARY INITIATES ACTION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. POST-ELECTION THE MILITARY AND ITS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP WAIT FOR ANY ELECTORAL COMPLAINTS TO GO AWAY. WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT SAFELY INSTALLED, IT COULD THEN EASILY SEAL THE CONFLICT AREA AND GO AFTER THE EZLN AT ITS LEISURE; THIS REMAINS A DIFFICULT PROPOSITION, AS THE TERRAIN AND CURRENT STATE OF THE MEXICAN ARMY ARE NOT EQUAL TO THE TASK.

~~NOFORN~~

IF THE GOVERNMENT DESIRES TO REDUCE THE PROBLEM VIA "CUTTING OFF" THE PEASANT POPULATION FROM WHICH THE EZLN DRAWS ITS STRENGTH, AND IF PAYING THE POLITICAL PRICE SIX YEARS LATER IS ACCEPTABLE, THIS IS A POTENTIAL SCENARIO.

5) ANOTHER SCENARIO. SHOULD A MINORITY CANDIDATE WIN OR SHOULD SIGNIFICANT PRI LOSSES OCCUR BELOW NATIONAL LEVEL, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY VIOLENCE WINDOW SCENARIO WOULD OCCUR IN THE SHORT-TERM, GIVING BOTH SIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS AMICABLY OR AT LEAST IN A PEACEFUL MANNER.

6) SUMMARY. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE EZLN, IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER SOCIETAL ELEMENTS, WILL EITHER INITIATE HOSTILITIES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE ELECTION [REDACTED] OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER [REDACTED]

THE MOST LIKELY WINDOW IS NUMBER THREE, WITH THE EZLN INITIATING ARMED CONFLICT UNDER THE PRETENSE OF ELECTORAL FRAUD, SHOULD THE EZLN'S LEADERSHIP BELIEVE THE ELECTIONS WERE NOT FAIR, HONEST, AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE. THE INITIATION OF VIOLENCE WINDOW ONE HAS ONE MAJOR DRAWBACK FOR THE EZLN-- PROBABLE LOSS OF SUPPORT AND SHIFT IN WORLDWIDE PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD THE EZLN PREEMPT THE ELECTORAL PREROGATIVE OF THE MEXICAN PEOPLE BY INITIATING HOSTILITIES PRE-ELECTION. EVEN THOUGH THE MILITARY (AT LEAST AT THE JUNIOR- TO MID-LEVEL OFFICER LEVELS) MAY FEEL MILITARILY PREPARED TO GO AFTER THE EZLN, IT IS FAR LESS LIKELY THAT THE GOM WILL INITIATE HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTION (VIOLENCE WINDOW 2), OR EVEN AFTER WITHOUT SOME (POSSIBLY SELF-GENERATED) PROVOCATION.



ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .
COLL: (U) AB.
INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]
PREP: (U) [REDACTED]
ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]
DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

~~DECL: OADR~~

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