 |
The Center for Latin American Issues
Presents
Whither Venezuela?
A symposium on the current situation in Venezuela
and the country’s future prospects
April 19, 2002
Ambassador Luis Herrera Marcano
Embassy of Venezuela,
Washington, D.C. |
Mr. Brian Naranjo
Country Officer for Venezuela,
U.S. Department of State |
BG Boris Saavedra
Executive Advisor,
Inter-American Defense College |
Mr. Paulo Sotero
Journalist,
O Estado de São Paulo |
The April 11 coup attempt against Hugo Chavez was a manifestation of
political problems that have festered for decades. This, according to
Luis Herrera Marcano, Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.S. In the last
ten years especially, the disparity between Venezuela’s haves and
have-nots has become more pronounced. Nothing has been done to bring about
reform, and the country’s poor grow increasingly disenfranchised and
skeptical about democracy. The resulting discontent led to the collapse of
Venezuela’s traditional ruling class in 1998, when the masses turned to
Chavez, electing him president in a landslide victory. Since then,
however, the country has experienced growing confrontation and
polarization due, at least in part, to Chavez’s excessively combative
style.
 |
 |
| Symposium participants: Mr. Paulo Sotero, BG Boris
Saavedra, Mr. Brian Naranjo, and Amb. Luis Herrera. (seated, left to
right) |
Ambassador Luis Herrera Marcano addresses the
audience.
|
The good news is that the massive protests in the wake of April 11, and
the military’s refusal to suppress them, demonstrated that an overwhelming
majority of Venezuelans – and a preponderance of the military – rejected
the unconstitutional imposition of Carmona’s government and its summary
dissolution of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court. Democracy has
prevailed in Venezuela.
Now that Chavez is back in power, what’s next? Marcano hopes that all
segments of Venezuelan society will respond to Chavez’s call for national
reconciliation. He hopes also that the April 18 meeting of the Federal
Council was a first step in the process, that old attitudes of denial have
been overcome, and that both sides have realized that neither can suppress
the other. But one thing is sure: There’s no going back to the old status
quo, with the elites alone enjoying all the benefits. Each party must
seize this opportunity for dialogue and for reform.
Brian Naranjo, Country Officer for Venezuela at the U.S. Department
of State, explained the U.S. position on, and response to, the crisis. He
noted, as did Amb. Marcano earlier, that April 11 had antecedents in
Chavez’s polarizing personality and confrontations with many segments of
Venezuelan society: business, labor, the Catholic Church. Naranjo
dismissed out of hand the unfounded allegations of U.S. complicity in
Chavez’s ouster, stressing that the Bush Administration in no way
supported, encouraged, or approved of any rupturing of the constitutional
process in Venezuela. Rather, the U.S. opposed the coup in no uncertain
terms, engaged actively in the Organization of American States session to
consider the situation, and supported Secretary Gaviria’s mission to
Venezuela.
The U.S. government recognizes Chavez as the legitimate,
democratically-elected President of Venezuela. The U.S. recognizes also,
however, that the Venezuelan problem won’t be solved until Chavez
addresses the country’s polarization and the underlying causes of the
conflict. Moreover, the international community, and particularly the OAS,
must become actively involved in resolving the Venezuelan situation.
Boris Saavedra, Executive Advisor at the Inter-American Defense
College, and retired Brigadier General in the Venezuelan Air Force,
analyzed Venezuela’s crisis from the perspective of civil-military
relations. Under Chavez, civil-military relations have deteriorated: a
demise of lawful civilian control over the Armed Forces; a reorganization
of military command to ensure Chavez’s personal control over it; and new
domestic missions for the military which, without civilian oversight,
provide temptations for corruption, particularly by officers occupying
civilian government positions. Society’s resentment of the military is
increasing, especially after the failed coup attempt.
Chavez’s imposition of a left-wing political ideology on the Armed Forces
has created three competing factions within the military: one small group
supports Chavez, another small group opposes him and, in the middle, the
vast majority rejects any military involvement in the political arena.
This apolitical preponderance in the military made it impossible for the
April 11 coup to succeed.
Saavedra maintains that the role Chavez envisions for the military ensures
extensive military intervention in domestic politics. This attitude will
serve only to alienate more members of the Armed Forces, who are already
increasingly discontent with their lack of modern equipment and training,
with the corruption of senior commanders appointed by Chavez, and with
their low salaries. The President has become hostage to a small faction in
the military upon which he must rely.
Saavedra’s bottom line is that the crisis in civil-military relations
reflects and reinforces Venezuela’s ongoing political crisis. A balance in
civil-military relations is necessary for democratic stability. But
civil-military relations are unlikely to improve under Chavez, a palpable
threat to Venezuelan democracy. Who but an authoritarian could say, as
Chavez did on June 30 last year, “Who is the Congress to tell me what I
ought to do as commander-in-chief of the armed forces?”
 |
 |
| Mr. Brian Naranjo, Country Officer for Venezuela,
explains the U.S. position regarding recent events in Venezuela. |
BG Boris Saavedra, Inter-American Defense College,
discusses civil/military relations in the Venezuelan context. |
Paulo Sotero, Brazilian correspondent with O Estado de São Paulo,
discussed the Venezuelan situation from a journalist’s perspective. Sotero
was openly critical of his colleagues’ performance throughout the crisis;
they’ve made many mistakes. Although admittedly the media work under
extreme pressure, especially during a crisis, Sotero finds no excuse for
circulating unfounded rumors, such as occurred recently in a front-page
Washington Post story suggesting U.S. complicity in Chavez’s overthrow.
The Venezuelan press also has failed the people. Currently there is a
virtual news blackout in Venezuela which, Sotero suspects, is the result
of media owners not wanting to report on the popular support for Chavez.
Sotero is critical also of the United States. He’s puzzled over why the
U.S. was so slow in recognizing that a coup had indeed taken place, noting
that all the signs were there: Chavez submitted no resignation letter to
the National Assembly, and the Carmona government’s first act was to
dissolve the county’s constitutional institutions. For Sotero, the
misperceptions of the U.S., such as the aforementioned Washington Post
article, are the result of the Administration’s lack of consultation with
Latin American leaders. According to Sotero, by failing to condemn the
coup immediately and to consult sufficiently with Latin American leaders,
the U.S. has damaged its credibility in the region.
 |
 |
| Mr. Paulo Sotero, a journalist with "O Estado de São
Paulo," discusses the implications
of President Chavez’s return for the press and
civil society. |
Panelists answer questions from the audience. |
The organizers thank Delta Air Lines for its generous sponsorship of this
event.

|