

A Magyar Népköztársaság Nagykövetsége

Embajada de la Republica Popular Hungara

LA HABANA

12/11/1962

10

Szigorúan titkos!

4/10 tr

Készült: 4 példányban  
Kapja: 3 " Központ  
1 " Köv. Irattár

443  
...../1962/szig.titk.

Gépelte: Kissné

Havanna, 1962. december 1.

Tárgy: A szovjet-kubai nézeteltérések lényegéről.

New-Yorkból október 20-án történt visszatérésem óta tulajdonképpen egyetlen alkalommal sem sikerült kubai vezető emberekkel beszélnem. Az azóta eltelt idő alatt nem jutott kubai vezetőhöz a baráti országok egyik követe, közöttük a csehszlovák nagykövet sem. A csehszlovák nagykövet pedig, minthogy ő volt Havannában a szocialista országok első képviselője, naponta többször is találkozott mindenekelőtt Roa külügyminiszterrel és igen gyakran a többi vezetővel is. Roa külügyminiszterrel elsősorban azért, mert az Egyesült Államokban Csehszlovákia képviseli a kubai érdekeket, a washingtoni csehszlovák követség és a havannai nagykövetség között külön közvetlen rejtjel összeköttetés és futárszolgálat van. Ebben az időszakban ő sem jutott kubai vezetőkhöz és Roa külügyminiszter, akivel a legszorosabb és legbizalmasabb viszonyban volt, ebben az időszakban vele is hűvösen viselkedett, vagy ha az utóbbi napokban ez a hűvösség engedett is, semmi lényegeset néki mondani hajlandó nem volt.

Minthogy hamarosan meggyőződtem a többi szocialista követhoz hasonlóan arról, hogy felső vezetőkhez jutni nem tudok, elhatároztam, ahogyan ők is elhatározták, hogy alacsonyabb szintű, különböző helyen dolgozó kubai funkcionáriusokat fogunk megkeresni és velük fogunk a politikai problémákról beszélgetni. Így az október vége óta eltelt idő alatt magam és munkatársaim, közöttük elsősorban Görög tanácsos és Sós kereskedelmi tanácsos, mintegy 20-25 középfunkcionáriussal beszélgettünk.

Pavlicsek csehszlovák nagykövettel havannai tartózkodásom elejétől fogva a legszorosabb viszonyban voltam. Az információinkat gyakran kicseréltük, a különböző problémákat mindig megbeszéltük. A mostani válságperiódusban ez a kapcsolat néha napenkénti többszöri telefonbeszélgetésre, vagy szükség esetén néha egymás lakásán éjjeli találkozásokra is sűrűsödött. Majdnem hasonló szoros kapcsolatban voltam ezen idő alatt a román, és a lengyel nagykövettel is. Ők is körülbelül 20-25 középfunkcionáriussal találkoztak, a véleményünket kicseréltük, a levont következtetéseket megbeszéltük, úgy hogy ami e jelentésben következik, nemcsak a saját véleményem, hanem a döntő kérdésekben az általunk folytatott beszélgetésekből és azok összevetéséből leszűrt.

Péter János külügyminiszter elvtársnak  
B u d a p e s t .

Magyar Országos Levéltár

XIX-7-1-j - Kuba-11/f.-009037/1/1962. (5-d)

KÜLÜGYMINISZTERI  
Központi Titkos Irtó Osztály  
Szigorúan Titkos!  
1962 DEC 1  
009037/1  
14

**Telegram from the Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba on Soviet-Cuban Differences  
1 December 1962**

Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic  
443/1962/ top secret  
Typed by: Kissné

TOP SECRET!  
Written: in four copies  
Three copies to Center  
One copy to Emb. Archives

Havana, 1 December 1962  
Subject: The essence of  
Soviet-Cuban divergences  
of opinion.

Since my return from New York on 20 October I have not once managed to talk to any Cuban leaders. Since then no ambassadors of the friendly countries including Czechoslovakia have managed to contact any Cuban leaders. As for the Czechoslovak ambassador, who is the first representative of the socialist countries to Havana, he used to meet, first of all, Foreign Minister Roa several times a day and often the other leaders as well. Foreign Minister Roa first of all because, in the United States, Cuban interests are represented by Czechoslovakia; between the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington and the Havana Embassy there is a special direct code connection and courier service. In this period he has not been able to get in to see any Cuban leaders and Foreign Minister Roa, who had the closest and most confidential relationship with him, has behaved toward him coolly; even if this coolness has become relaxed in recent days, he has not been willing to say anything important to him.

As I, similar to the other socialist ambassadors, was soon convinced that I could not get in to meet with the higher leaders, I like them decided to turn to lower-ranking Cuban functionaries working in different places and talk to them about political problems. So since the end of October my colleagues and I, first of all counselor Görög and commercial counselor Sós, have talked to 20-25 mid-level functionaries.

I have had the closest relationship with Czechoslovak Ambassador Pavlíček since the beginning of my stay in Havana. We have often exchanged information, we have always discussed different problems. This relationship has become even more intensive during this period of crisis, and sometimes meant several phone conversations a day or, if necessary, meetings at night in each other's flats. I have had almost as close a relationship with the Romanian and Polish ambassadors as well. They have met about 20-25 mid-level functionaries too; we have exchanged our opinions, and we have discussed our conclusions, so what will follow in my report is not only my opinion but what I have concluded from our conversations and their comparisons concerning the crucial issues.

I consider three factors important and I would like to deal with them one after the other. The first one is the individual attitudes of the Cuban leaders. I must say, when it comes to Cuban leaders, I think of three people -- Prime Minister Fidel Castro, his

brother, Vice-Premier Raul Castro, and Minister of Industry Ernesto Guevara – as during the crisis it has turned out that non other than these three have a serious and important say in the government, the party secretariat and, most of all, in the party's central committee; as a matter of fact, the opinion of these three people in crucial matters cannot be successfully contradicted even by their closest colleagues. So President of the Republic Dorticos or Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the director of the national land reform institute, could not have a significant influence on events.

The fact that Cuba became a country independent of the United States, the greatest imperialist power, unaided, through a movement led by Fidel Castro, that she could develop the fight for independence and the democratic revolution into a socialist revolution on her own, has made the people especially jealous and sensitive concerning everything related to the independence, self-government and freedom of the country. This can be understood, as it is a relatively small country enjoying the benefits of modern technology but lacking industry, a mono-cultural country with colonial conditions, liberated after several centuries of colonial or semi-colonial oppression. This sensitivity and jealousy concerning freedom, self-government and independence is especially strongly reflected in the leaders, most of all, in the three leaders mentioned above.

As for the leaders, this is also complemented by the fact that they arrived at the socialist revolution, Marxism-Leninism, in a different way from all other countries. This is also coupled with the individual ambitions of the leaders, which is partly a consequence of the fact that they have been appointed to lead a historic movement and victorious revolution, and a country that is in the center of world politics at the moment.

The second factor, which plays a role at every level, and also in the great masses of the Cuban people, but is particularly strong among the leaders, can be called revolutionary romanticism with many petty bourgeois and anarchist features. One can also mention here that the Cuban people and, of course, their present leaders, have never experienced any great events shocking all of Cuban society, like a war, revolution or natural catastrophe. So they know nothing of country-wide misery, the decay following the Great War, the participation of large masses in the revolutionary struggle, or famine striking all of society or at least its majority, or other similar blows. A characteristic of the great Cuban masses and, I must repeat, particularly of the leaders, the different ranks of leading layers, is what can be described by the Spanish expression: *inmolación*. This could be translated as self-sacrifice. Here one can mention a lack of knowledge and underestimation of economic building work, of doing small jobs for a long time every day and imagining all solutions through great, heroic, revolutionary deeds.

The third and most important feature, which is however related to the first two, is political. In the political ideas of the Cuban leaders the idea that there have been three great revolutions in the world plays an important role. The first is the Russian revolution, the main significance of which is, however, limited to Europe. The second is the Chinese, which concerns Asian people mainly. And finally, the latest, the third is the Cuban, which is crucially important to Latin America. Taking such an idea as a starting point, the Cuban leaders often judge events of world importance not from the aspect of the world-

wide victory of socialism, or from the aspect of the international world movement, but from the so-called Latin American aspect.

This point of view is not Marxist. But where Latin America is concerned, their conception, their opinion diverges from or is contrary to the Marxist-Leninist conception several times. The "Second Havana Declaration" could be a good example, which assesses the origin, course and victory of Latin American revolutions differently from the Marxist way in various aspects. (The preparation of the revolution and the revolutionary fight are not carried out by a Marxist-Leninist party, but mainly a small group of partisans supported by peasants; the working class joins the fight only later, and the Marxist class analysis and class aspects are completely ignored.) The Cuban leaders underestimate the role of the party in Cuba herself, which is proved by the extremely slow organization of the party. According to my information, the official number of members of the party does not reach 4,000. Reorganization is going on very slowly and since the Escalante case about 2,000 former party members were excluded.

The above-mentioned explains [Cuba's] taking offense at the Soviet Union for not having discussed her urgent steps with the Cuban leaders in the gravest moments of the crisis, in this way already offending Cuba's sovereignty by ignoring Cuba's self-government and independence during the talks with the Americans when she [the Soviet Union] discussed inspections and other issues concerning Cuba's sovereignty. That they were unwilling to accept the solution suggested by the Soviet Union for weeks meant they did not disagree with the method only, but to some extent with the Soviets' aim too, they probably always had in mind their idea about their Latin American role.

Finally I would like to present Comrade Mikoyan's opinion concerning the Cuban leaders, which I agree with:

The Cuban leaders are young, honest people, they are true to the revolution, the people; in a difficult situation in their country they were able to ensure greater unity and had less chaos than other nations would have had; for this they deserve respect and appreciation, and there is every reason to trust them and their progress in the future.

János Beck  
Ambassador

To Comrade Foreign Minister János Péter  
Budapest.

*[Source: Hungarian National Archives, Foreign Ministry, Top Secret Files, XIX-J-I-j. Obtained by the Cold War History Research Centre, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Translated by Attila Kolontari and Zsófia Zelnik.]*